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I. Introduction
Congress enacted The Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act' of 1980 (CERCLA)
to encourage responsibility in handling hazardous substances,2
1. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1983 & Supp. 1990), amended by
The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No.
99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
2. CERCLA defines what substances are considered hazardous waste under the
statute.
The term "hazardous substance" means (A) any substance designated pursu-
ant to § 1321(b)(2)(A) of Title 33, (B) any element, compound, mixture, solu-
tion, or substance designated pursuant to § 9602 of this title, (C) any hazard-
ous waste having characteristics identified under or listed pursuant to § 3001
of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. 6921] (but not including any
waste the regulation of which under the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42
U.S.C.A. § 9601] has been suspended by Act of Congress), (D) any toxic pol-
lutant listed under § 1317(a) of Title 33, (E) any hazardous air pollutant
listed under § 112 of the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C. § 7412], and (F) any immi-
nently hazardous chemical substance or mixture with respect to which the
Administrator has taken action pursuant to § 2606 of Title 15. The term does
not include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is
393
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provide rapid response to environmental emergencies, en-
courage voluntary cleanup of hazardous spills, encourage early
reporting of violations, and ensure that parties responsible for
the release' of hazardous substances bear the costs of re-
sponse.4 CERCLA was amended by the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) in 1986 and is due for
reauthorization in 1994. The reauthorization debate will begin
in the 103d Congress, 1993. It will inevitably focus on the suc-
cess and validity of the liability approach of the statute, which
attempts to shift the cost burden of cleanup to responsible
parties rather than to the taxpayer.'
not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance under
subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph, and the term does not in-
clude natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquified natural gas, or synthetic gas
usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas).
42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1989).
3. CERCLA defines release:
The term "release" means any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting,
emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing
into the environment (including the abandonment or discarding of barrels,
containers, and other closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance
or pollutant or contaminant), but excludes (A) any release which results in
exposure to persons solely within a workplace, with respect to a claim which
such persons may assert against the employer of such persons, (B) emissions
from the engine exhaust of a motor vehicle, rolling stock, aircraft, vessel, or
pipeline pumping station engine, (C) release of source byproduct, or special
nuclear material from a nuclear incident, as those terms are defined in the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 [42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq.], if such release is sub-
ject to requirements with respect to financial protection established by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission under § 170 of such Act [42 U.S.C. § 2210],
or, for the purposes of § 9604 of this title or any other response action, any
release of source byproduct, or special nuclear material from any processing
site designated under § 7912(a)(1) or 7942(a) of this title, and (D) the normal
application of fertilizer.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1989).
4. Chemical Waste Mgmt. v. Armstrong World Indus., 669 F. Supp. 1285, 1290
n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1989); see infra note 8. See also General Elec. Co. v. Litton
Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1421 (8th Cir. 1990). See generally
Katherine N. Probst & Paul R. Portney, ASSIGNING LIABILITY FOR SUPERFUND CLEAN-
UPS: AN ANALYSIS OF POLICY OPTIONS (1992) [hereinafter Probst & Portney]. CERCLA
is scheduled for reauthorization in 1994. Probst and Portney analyze the advantages
and disadvantages of alternatives to the current Superfund liability approach: 1) sta-
tus quo, 2) expanded mixed funding for orphan shares, 3) liability release for all
closed co-disposal sites, 4) liability release for current NPL sites.
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol10/iss1/11
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To further the purpose of CERCLA, Congress enacted §
9604 to authorize the federal government to clean up hazard-
ous substances. To pay for these federal cleanup actions,
Congress allocated taxpayer dollars to Superfund in § 9611.7
In § 9607 Congress authorized private parties to recover re-
sponse costs incurred in cleaning up sites.' This liability ap-
6. CERCLA defines the circumstances under which the government may respond
to a release or threatened release of hazardous substances.
(1) Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substan-
tial threat of such a release into the environment, or (B) there is a release or
substantial threat of release into the environment of any pollutant or con-
taminant which may present an imminent and substantial danger to the pub-
lic health or welfare, the President is authorized to act, consistent with the
national contingency plan, to remove or arrange for the removal of, and pro-
vide for remedial action relating to such hazardous substance, pollutant, or
contaminant at any time (including its removal from any contaminated natu-
ral resource), or take any other response measure consistent with the national
contingency plan which the President deems necessary to protect the public
health or welfare or the environment.
42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1989).
7. CERCLA provides for the funds to clean up hazardous substances.
For the purposes specified in this section there is authorized to be appropri-
ated from the Hazardous Substance Superfund established under subchapter
A of chapter 98 of Title 26 not more than $8,500,000,000 for the 5-year period
beginning on October 17, 1986, and not more than $5,100,000,000 for the pe-
riod commencing October 1, 1991, and ending September 30, 1994, and such
sums shall remain available until expended. The preceding sentence consti-
tutes a specific authorization for the funds appropriated under title II of
Public Law 99-160 (relating to payment to the Hazardous Substances Trust
Fund). The President shall use the money in the Fund for the following pur-
poses: (1) Payment of governmental response costs incurred pursuant to §
9604 of this title ... (2) Payment of any claim for necessary response costs
incurred by any other person as a result of carrying out the national contin-
gency plan established under § 1321(c) of Title 33 and amended by § 9605 of
this title.
42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (Supp. II 1991).
8. CERCLA imposes liability upon those who are responsible for the release or
threatened release of hazardous substances.
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, (2) any person who at the
time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at
which such hazardous substances were disposed of, (3) any person who by
contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or ar-
ranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazard-
ous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or
entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another
party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and (4) any person
who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal
3
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proach under § 9607 has led to legal action, especially when
multiple potentially responsible parties contest liability.'
However, Congress did not explicitly authorize the recovery of
attorney fees from responsible parties. Courts have consist-
ently held that § 9607 creates a private cause of action for
recovery of response costs.10 Permitting private parties to re-
cover response costs for cleaning up hazardous substances is
intended to encourage greater voluntary cleanup.1" "Private
cleanups conserve the resources of the EPA and Superfund,
and enhance the EPA's effort to deal with the massive prob-
or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person,
from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incur-
rence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for- (A) all
costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Govern-
ment or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contin-
gency plan; (B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other
person consistent with the national contingency plan; (C) damages for injury
to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs
of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release;
and (D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out
under § 9604(i) of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1989).
9. John Paul Acton & Lloyd S. Dixon, SUPERFUND AND TRANSACTION COSTS: THE
EXPERIENCE OF INSURERS AND VERY LARGE INDUSTRIAL FIRMS (1992) [hereinafter Ac-
ton & Dixon]. A recent Rand Institute study found that 88% of the money spent on
Superfund activity by large insurance companies went to transaction costs rather
than cleanup. The breakdown of this expenditure included: 42% on coverage disputes
and 37% on policy holder defense. According to Rand, large industrial firms spent an
average of 21% of Superfund on transaction costs. These firms spent an average of
39% on transaction costs at multiple PRP sites. "Most of the costs were for legal
costs." Id. at 61.
10. See, e.g., Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d
1074, 1078 (1st Cir. 1986).
11. See Richard F. Stool & Karen M. Wardzinski, A "CERCLA - Quality
Cleanup:" The New Path to Righteousness (and Recovery) for Volunteers, C506
A.L.I. A.B.A 191, (1990) [hereinafter Stool & Wardzinski]. In order to bring a private
cost recovery action, a plaintiff's cleanup of a site must be "'consistent with the Na-
tional Contingency Plan.'" Id. at 193-94. However, the courts have applied different
interpretations as to what constitutes NCP "consistency." Id. at 197. In an effort to
reduce much of the confusion and debate over the issue, the EPA on March 8, 1990,
released its final revisions to the NCP which included "detailed regulation defining
NCP consistency." Id. at 199. The EPA revisions established greater flexibility in
meeting the requirements set forth in the NCP. Id. at 204. While parties under the
new EPA revisions need only substantially comply with the NCP's procedural re-
quirements, they must nonetheless achieve a "CERCLA-quality cleanup." Id. at 202.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol10/iss1/11
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lem of improper disposal of hazardous substances."12
Although CERCLA clearly defines the parties liable for
cleanup costs in § 9607,18 the statute does not clearly define
what costs may be recovered as response costs.14 Section 9601
provides that response costs include enforcement activities re-
lated to the removal15 or remedial" actions. However, courts
12. Lewis M. Barr, CERCLA Made Simple: An Analysis of the Cases Under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980,
45 Bus. LAW 923, 952 (1990) [hereinafter Barr] (quoting Stevens Creek Assoc. v. Bar-
clays Bank, Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 88-15503, 1364-65 (March 29, 1989), Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2 (U.S. Feb. 17, 1989)).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1989).
14. "The terms 'respond' or 'response' means remove, removal, remedy, and re-
medial action;, all such terms (including the terms 'removal' and 'remedial action')
include enforcement activities related thereto." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1989).
15. CERCLA defines what is considered a removal under the statute.
The terms "remove" or "removal" means the cleanup or removal of released
hazardous substances from the environment, such actions as may be neces-
sary taken in the event of the threat of release of hazardous substances into
the environment, such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and
evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances, the disposal
of removed material, or the taking of such other actions as may be necessary
to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to
the environment, which may otherwise result from a release or threat of re-
lease. The term includes, in addition, without being limited to, security fenc-
ing or other measures to limit access, provision of alternative water supplies,
temporary evacuation and housing of threatened individuals not otherwise
provided for, action taken under § 9604(b) of this title, and any emergency
assistance which may be provided under the Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act [42 U.S.C. § 5121].
42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1989).
16. CERCLA defines what is considered a remedy under the statute.
The terms "remedy" or "remedial action" means those actions consistent
with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition to removal actions in
the event of a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance into the
environment, to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances so
that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future
public health or welfare or the environment. The term includes, but is not
limited to, such actions at the location of the release as storage, confinement,
perimeter protection using dikes, trenches, or ditches, clay cover, neutraliza-
tion, cleanup of released hazardous substances and associated contaminated
materials, recycling or reuse, diversion, destruction, segregation or reactive
wastes, dredging or excavations, repair or replacement of leaking containers,
collection of leachate and runoff, on site treatment or incineration, provision
of alternative water supplies, and any monitoring reasonably required to as-
sure that such actions protect the public health and welfare and the environ-
ment. The term includes the costs of permanent relocation of residents and
1992]
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do not agree on the issue of whether the recovery of attorney
fees is included in the terms "response costs" and "enforce-
ment activities."1 7
The Eighth Circuit 8 is the only circuit court of appeals to
address the issue of whether attorney fees are recoverable as
response costs in a private party CERCLA action." The court
held in General Electric Co. v. Litton Industries (Litton) that
attorney fees were recoverable under the statute. Litton peti-
tioned the Supreme Court on the issue of attorney fees, but
the Supreme Court denied certiorari.20 As a result, the issue
remains unresolved. 21
In addition, recent studies indicate that transaction costs
for CERCLA actions are very high. If Congress continues the
liability approach for the cleanup of hazardous substances, it
should amend the statute to encourage settlements and re-
duce transaction and legal costs. If responsible parties know
they are liable for cleanup costs and legal fees of plaintiffs
seeking recovery, they will have an incentive to settle and to
spend money on the actual clean up rather than disputing the
claim.
To analyze whether attorney fees should be recoverable
as response costs under CERCLA, this article addresses four
issues. First, it reviews the American Rule for payment of at-
torney fees, the exceptions to this Rule, and the exceptions
applicable to CERCLA. Second, it analyzes whether the lan-
guage in CERCLA satisfies the requirements of the applicable
businesses and community facilities where the President determines that,
alone or in combination with other measures, such relocation is more cost-
effective than and environmentally preferable to the transportation, storage,
treatment, destruction, or secure disposition offsite of hazardous substances,
or may otherwise be necessary to protect the public heath or welfare; the
term includes offsite transport and offsite storage, treatment, destruction, or
secure disposition of hazardous substances and associated contaminated
materials.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1989).
17. Fallowfield Dev. Corp. v. Strunk, 776 F. Supp. 335, 337-38 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
18. General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys. Inc., 920 F.2d 1415 (8th
Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111. S. Ct. 1390 (1991).
19. Id. To date, Litton, is the only circuit court of appeals to deal with this issue.
20. Litton, 111 S. Ct. 1390 (1991).
21. Infra pp. 20-29.
[Vol. 10
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exception. Third, it examines the relevant case law since cer-
tiorari was denied. And finally, it discusses the current status
of the issue.
II. American Rule and its Exceptions
A. American Rule
Unlike the English law, which authorizes courts to award
attorney fees to prevailing parties,2 the United States has his-
torically held litigating parties responsible for their own legal
fees. 23 This is known as the American Rule. Despite this gen-
eral rule, three exceptions are firmly rooted in United States
legal history. These exceptions are authorized by statute,
court order, rules of procedure, and contract.2 '
B. Exceptions to American Rule
As early as 1796, the Supreme Court recognized the first
exception to the American Rule: attorney fees are recoverable
by explicit statutory authorization.2 5 Today, Congress has en-
22. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 n.18 (1975)
(quoting Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717
(1967)).
As early as 1278, the courts of England were authorized to award counsel fees
to successful plaintiffs in litigation. Similarly, since 1607 English courts have
been empowered to award counsel fees to defendants in all actions where
such awards might be made to plaintiffs. Rules governing administration of
these and related provisions have developed over the years. It is now custom-
ary in England, after litigation of substantive claims [have] terminated, to
conduct separate hearings before special 'taxing Masters' in order to deter-
mine the appropriateness and the size of an award of counsel fees. To pre-
vent the ancillary proceedings from becoming unduly protracted and burden-
some, fees which may be included in an award are usually prescribed, even
including the amounts that may be recovered for letters drafted on behalf of
a client.
23. Alyeska, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
24. Donald G. McCabe, FEDERAL RULE 11: NEW SANCTIONS FOR OVERZEALOUS AD-
VOCACY, BROKER-DEALERS: REG. & LITIG. PROGRAM (Practicing Law Institute, New
York, N.Y.) Nov. 18-19, 1985, at 177, 180.
25. See Arcambel v. Wisemen, 3 U.S. 306 (1796). Even when there is no statutory
provision for attorney fees in the statute under which a party is bringing an action,
the party may be awarded fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. A plaintiff may
recover attorney fees under this Act if: 1) the action is by or against the federal gov-
ernment and the government cannot show its position was "substantially justified"
1992]
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acted over eighty-nine statutory provisions for the recovery of
attorney fees. 26 Furthermore, Congress has enacted numerous
fee-shifting statutes that authorize the recovery of attorney
fees in environmental actions.27
By 1882, the Supreme Court recognized a second excep-
tion to the American Rule: the common benefit/common fund
exception.2" According to the Supreme Court, a successful
plaintiff may recover attorney fees when the litigation pro-
vides a common benefit to a group. 29 When there has been a
common fund established for the benefit of plaintiffs and
third parties, attorney fees may be paid by the fund rather
than by the plaintiffs.30
Recognizing a third exception, the Supreme Court held
that courts may award attorney fees against parties whose
and 2) special circumstances make the award unjust. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)(1988).
26. Daniel Riesel, Citizen Suits, and the Award of Attorneys' Fees in Environ-
mental Law, C637 A.L.I.A.B.A. 1001, 1047 n.30 (1991) (citing Legislative History of
the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards of 1976, prepared by the Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, Riesel also comments that
many other federal statutes may provide authority for fee-shifting in environmental
actions, e.g. The Freedom of Information Act). See also Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 260 n.33
(list of federal statutes authorizing the recovery of attorney fees).
27. Robert L. Boes, Liability for Attorney's Fees in Environmental Litigation,
38 AuG. LA. B.J. 93, 94 n.6 (environmental statutes that authorize the recovery of
attorney fees: Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2618(d); Endangered Species
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §
1270(d); Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1427(c); Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d); Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1415(g)(4); Deepwater Port Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1515(d); Safe Drinking Water
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300J-8(d); Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4911(d); Energy Policy and
Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6305(d); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f); Powerplant
and Industrial Fuel Use Act, 42 U.S.C. § 8435(d); Ocean Thermal Energy Conserva-
tion Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9124(d)); Riesel supra note 26 (list of federal environmental
statutes that authorize the award of attorney fees: Toxic Substance Control Act 15
U.S.C. § 2619(c)(2); Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. §
1415(g)(4); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d); Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("Superfund") § 310(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9659(f).
28. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881).
29. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 at 5-6 n.7 (1972) (quoting Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite,
396 U.S. 355, 393-94 (1970)). The rationale for this exception is that it would be un-
fair for the plaintiff to pay attorney fees while the group enjoys the benefits.
30. Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472 (1980).
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conduct in the judicial process merits censure under a variety
of circumstances. For instance, courts may enforce their own
orders by awarding attorney fees for the intentional violation
of a court order.31 Also, a court may order the recovery of at-
torney fees based on a showing of bad faith.3 2
Generally, courts are unwilling to award attorney fees un-
less the requirements for one of these exception are fully met.
The second exception mentioned above, explicit statutory au-
thorization, is applicable to CERCLA.
C. Application to Private Recovery Actions Under CERCLA
The courts' debate centers on the definition of response
costs. Every court that has addressed the issue of whether to
award attorney fees in private CERCLA actions has applied
the American Rule and the explicit statutory authorization
exception. The courts that have refused to award fees have
held that the statute does not explicitly provide for such re-
covery. The courts that have awarded attorney fees have
found these costs to be included in the terms "response costs"
and "enforcement activities."
III. Statutory Interpretation: Plain Meaning
A. Purist Plain Meaning
In order to determine whether attorney fees are explicitly
authorized in private party CERCLA recovery actions, courts
often apply a "plain meaning" approach in their statutory in-
31. Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 426-28 (1923).
32. F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974). The Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) provide other exceptions. The 1983 amend-
ments to Rule 11 of the FRCP authorize the award of attorney fees to a party if the
other party is found to either advance meritless claims and defenses or have engaged
in improper litigation tactics. Additionally, rule 16(f) authorizes recovery of attorney
fees for the other party's disobeying of pre-trial orders while rules 26(g) and 37(a)-(g)
permit a court to assess reasonable attorney fees against a party or attorney for acting
in a manner that warrants disciplinary action during discovery. Moreover, usually,
federal courts must award attorney fees if provided for by contract. FED. R. Civ. P. 11;
See also McCabe, supra note 24 at 181. (citing 6 J. Moore et al., MooRE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE P.54.77[2] (2d. 1974); see also Equitable Lumber Corp. v. I.P.A. Land Dev.
Corp., 344 N.E.2d 391 (N.Y. 1976)).
1992]
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terpretation. However, within this approach, courts differ as
to what should be considered when determining "plain
meaning."
The plain meaning purists, led by Justice Scalia, only
look at actual words used in a statute to determine its mean-
ing. s While scholars and judges who promote this method of
interpretation prevent the abuse of judicial bias, some believe
that they also prevent the beneficial use of subjective factors
when the actual words do not clearly state the meaning of a
statutory provision.-4 The purist isolates the actual language s
in CERCLA to determine whether to award attorney fees as
response costs. CERCLA states that the federal government' 6
and private parties" may recover response 8 costs that they
incur in response to a release 9 or threatened release of haz-
ardous substances" as long as the response is consistent with
the National Contingency Plan.41 The definition of recover-
able response costs includes enforcement activities, but it does
not specifically list attorney fees or litigation costs. Therefore,
plain meaning purists refuse to award attorney fees since
there is no explicit statutory authority for recovery. Accord-
ingly, they assert that the statutory exception to the American
33. Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formal-
ism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533, 559 (1992). Contra Steven F. Ross,
Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to
You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 564 (1992). The other end of the statutory interpretation
spectrum is led by scholars, such as Eskridge, and judges who advocate a more dy-
namic approach to statutory interpretation. These advocates favor an interpretation
that gives effect to contemporary public values. This method may reflect contempo-
rary values, but it also exposes statutes to the risk of judicial activism. The dynamist
approach of statutory interpretation is not a focus of this paper since each court that
has awarded attorney fees in private response actions has reasoned that attorney fees
are within the plain meaning of the term "response costs."
34. Farber, supra note 33, at 559.
35. Farber, supra note 33, at 533.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1989).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1989).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1989).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1989).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1989).
41. "The term 'national contingency plan' means the national contingency plan
published under § 1321(c) of Title 33 or revised pursuant to § 9605 of this title." 42
U.S.C § 9601(31) (1989).
[Vol. 10
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Rule is not satisfied under CERCLA.
B. Quasi Plain Meaning
While Justice Scalia favors a purist interpretation, others,
who also consider themselves to be plain meaning advocates,
recognize that it is sometimes necessary to look past the ac-
tual words of the statute to understand the plain meaning of a
term that is not defined in the statute."' These "quasi plain
meaning advocates" first look at the precise language of the
statute. Then, if this language is unclear, they analyze the
precise language based on a consideration of the legislative
purpose and history.
While it would be preferable to use the definition section
of CERCLA to determine the meaning of enforcement activi-
ties, the absence of a definition forces readers of the statute to
look to the plain meaning of the word. Black's Law Dictionary
defines enforce as "to put into execution, to cause to take ef-
fect, to make effective."' 3 Using such an approach, a quasi
plain meaning advocate could conclude that legal action is an
enforcement activity and attorney fees are therefore recover-
able costs in private response actions. Quasi plain meaning
advocates may also look at legislative intent and history when
statutory terms are unclear.
The following represents a compilation of the analysis
used by quasi plain meaning advocates:
Congress enacted CERCLA as a response to the threat to
public health posed by the widespread use and disposal of
hazardous substances." CERCLA is essentially a remedial
statute designed by Congress to protect and preserve public
health and the environment."5 Its provisions therefore should
42. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 396
(1950). According to Karl Llewellyn, statutory language is of primary importance. He
also urged courts to consider the court's sense of the situation, overall coherence of
the situation and legal system, presumed purpose of the statute and recent legislative
history. Farber, supra note 33, at 537.
43. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 528 (6th ed. 1990).
44. Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1455 (9th Cir. 1986).
45. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081
1992]
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be construed liberally to avoid frustration of the legislative in-
tent.46 CERCLA's purpose was to ensure the prompt and ef-
fective cleanup of waste disposal sites as well as to assure that
parties responsible for hazardous substances bore the cost of
the conditions they created.47 CERCLA authorizes govern-
ment and private party recovery of response costs. Private
parties may recover costs when the parties are directed by the
EPA and when they act voluntarily. In order to encourage vol-
untary private responses, CERCLA does not require private
parties to receive government approval in order to bring a re-
covery action. 8
The private recovery provisions of the statute, however,
serve a different purpose; they assure an incentive for pri-
vate parties, including those who may themselves be sub-
ject to liability under the statute, to take a leading role in
cleaning up hazardous waste facilities as rapidly and com-
pletely as possible. To require private parties to await
governmental approval would be to restrict the overall
national effort to the volume of activity which the federal
government could centrally supervise, and this would de-
feat the Act's basic intent. Congress provided for both of
these types of recovery actions in order to promote volun-
tary cleanup and to shift the cost burden to the parties
responsible for the release or threatened release.49
Referring to CERCLA, Senator Bradley stated: "Federal gov-
ernment cleanup and containment capability is viewed as
something of an appeal of last resort in the absence of any
other adequate and timely response."0
Quasi plain meaning advocates then may seek further
support in the SARA amendments of 1986.51 Before 1986, the
term "response" was defined as meaning "remove, removal,
(1st Cir. 1986).
46. Id.
47. Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1455.
48. Barr, supra note 12, at 997.
49. Id.
50. 26 Cong. Rec. 30,949 (1980).
51. Barr, supra note 12, at 949.
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remedy, and remedial action.""2 When Congress passed the
SARA amendments" in 1986, "response" was redefined to in-
clude enforcement activities related to costs of response."
There is limited legislative history to explain Congress' intent
in changing the definition of response." In reference to these
amendments, the EPA Administrator, Lee M. Thomas, em-
phasized that there is a need to conserve scarce taxpayer dol-
lars in the Superfund to those situations where responsible
parties are not held accountable for their actions.56 The EPA
needs to prioritize its efforts, handle the most immediately
dangerous environmental problems and leave less immediate
problems to private parties rather than the government.5 7
Quasi plain meaning advocates may also look to the 1990 revi-
sion to the National Contingency Plan, which further en-
couraged voluntary cleanups.58 The new regulations provide
that immaterial or insubstantial deviations from certain gov-
ernmental procedures will not make a private action inconsis-
tent with the NCP.5 9 "EPA believes that it is important to
encourage private parties to perform voluntary cleanups of
sites, and to remove unnecessary obstacles to their ability to
recover their costs from the parties that are liable for the
52. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(25) (1983).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1989), amended by SARA, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100
Stat. 1613 (1986).
54. Id. at 1615.
55. See Kanad D. Virk, General Electric Co. v. Litton Industrial. Automation
Systems, Inc.: Are Attorney Fees Recoverable in CERCLA Private Cost Recovery Ac-
tions?, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1541, 1556 (1991) [hereinafter Virk], (quoting H.R. Rep. No.
253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 55, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2838).
Virk quotes from H.R. 2817, the bill drafted to amend CERCLA that was not the
same bill that was eventually passed. "[T]he section modifies the definition of 're-
sponse action' to include related enforcement activities. The change will confirm the
EPA's authority to recover costs for enforcement actions taken against responsible
parties." Virk argues that the inclusion of one thing indicates the exclusion of an-
other. Nevertheless, Virk concedes that the Conference Report, H.R. Conf. Rep., No.
962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276. does not distinguish
between private parties and the government and concedes that there are no com-
ments about the addition of enforcement fees in the bill that eventually passes.
56. Barr, supra note 12, at 949.
57. Id.
58. Stool & Wardzinski, supra note 11, at 192.
59. 55 Fed Reg. 8792-93 (1990).
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contamination. 6 0
Quasi plain meaning advocates could then conclude that
it is necessary to encourage private parties to clean up hazard-
ous substances in order to successfully achieve the legislative
purpose of CERCLA.61 Private parties that clean up hazard-
ous substances most commonly retain legal counsel to recover
response costs from a responsible party.2 Allowing a private
party to recover attorney fees is consistent with the purpose
of CERCLA since it will encourage voluntary cleanup. Such
cleanup will reduce the administrative burden on the govern-
ment and the financial burden on the taxpayer. 3
IV. Case Law
A. Purist Plain Meaning
Since the Supreme Court denied certiorari on the issue of
recovery of attorney fees, some district courts applying the
purist plain meaning approach have refused to award attorney
fees." They examined the language of the statute and held
that Congress did not explicitly authorize the recovery of at-
torney fees in private party response actions.6 In each case,
the judge emphasized that the courts disagreed on the issue. 6
60. Id.
61. See Barr, supra note 12, at 950.
62. Cf. Don J. DeBenedictis, How Superfund Money is Spent, A.B.A.J., Sept.
1992, at 30 (according to a Rand Institute for Civil Justice study, in 1989 insurance
companies spent 88% of Superfund money on litigation expenses and only 12% on
actual clean up); Cf. Marianne Lavelle, Study Measures Superfund Costs, NAT'L L.
J., May 4, 1992, at 3 (citing a Rand Institute for Civil Justice study that found that in
1989 insurance companies spent $410 million on legal fees and only $60 million on
actual cleanup); Cf. Mark Trumbull, Cost of Superfund Lawsuits Stir Up Calls for
Change, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 11, 1992 at 7 (according to Insurance In-
formation Institute, much Superfund litigation could be avoided by use of a no fault
system of cleaning up sites).
63. See Barr, supra note 12, at 933.
64. See Fallowfield, 766 F. Supp. 335; In re Hemingway Transport, 126 B.R. 656
(D. Mass. 1991); New York v. S.C.A. Serv., 754 F. Supp. 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
65. Fallowfield, 766 F. Supp. 335; Hemingway, 126 B.R. 656, S.C.A., 754 F.
Supp. 995.
66. Fallowfield, 766 F. Supp. 335; Hemingway, 126 B.R. 656; S.C.A., 754 F.
Supp. 995.
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In In re Hemingway Transportation,6 7 Juniper Develop-
ment Group brought a CERCLA action against Hemingway
Transport and Bristol Terminals (collectively "Hemingway"),
the former owner of the site in question, to recover response
costs including attorney fees.68 The bankruptcy court held
that attorney fees are not recoverable as response costs in a
private party CERCLA action. 9  Juniper appealed the
decision.70
The bankruptcy court of appeals affirmed the denial of
attorney fees.71 It stated that CERCLA does not define "re-
sponse costs" despite the language in § 9601(25) providing re-
covery for enforcement activity.7 2 The court held that absent
explicit Congressional authorization, attorney fees are not a
recoverable cost of litigation.7 The court also held that legal
expenses may not be deemed recoverable as enforcement ac-
tivity.74 The court reasoned that the statute specifically pro-
vides for the recovery of attorney fees in other sections, but
that it does not specifically authorize recovery in private party
response actions.78
In New York v. S.C.A. Service,76 defendant Cortese Con-
struction operated a landfill at which S.C.A. disposed of in-
dustrial and chemical wastes.77 In 1983, the government
brought an action under CERCLA to recover response costs.7 8
67. Hemingway, 126 B.R. at 656.
68. Id. at 658. Hemingway filed for bankruptcy in 1982 and, while in Chapter 11,
sold a parcel of the property to Juniper. In 1985, the EPA discovered barrels of haz-
ardous waste on the property and directed Juniper to remove the drums and sur-
rounding soil. Juniper subsequently complied with the EPA order.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Hemingway, 126 B.R. at 658.
73. Id. (quoting Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976)).
74. Hemingway, 126 B.R. at 663. "[p]laintiffs may bring an action for recovery of
response costs, they may not bring an action to enforce CERCLA's cleanup provisions
against another private entity." Id. (quoting T & E Indus. v. Safety, 680 F. Supp. 696,
708 (D.N.J. 1988)).
75. Id.
76. S.C.A., 754 F. Supp. at 995.
77. Id. at 997.
78. Id. at 998. The state brought the action on its own behalf and as parens
patriae on behalf of its residents.
1992]
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SCA's counterclaim sought reimbursement for attorney fees
incurred when responding to conditions at the site. 9 Plaintiffs
sought to dismiss the counterclaim.8 0 The court dismissed
S.C.A.'s counterclaim for award of attorney fees.81 The court
emphasized that attorney fees are not recoverable if there is
no statutory provision for recovery.82 It reasoned that if Con-
gress had intended to permit recovery of attorney fees in pri-
vate party response actions, it would have included the lan-
guage in the appropriate section of the statute.8
In Leonard Partnership v. Town of Chenango,84 the
owner of property next to a municipal landfill85 brought an
action against the town alleging that hazardous substances
had been released from the landfill, thereby damaging the Le-
onard property.8 6 Leonard claimed that, as a result of the
landfill, "they have incurred substantial expenses and re-
sponse costs. ' 8 7 The court was unsure whether Leonard was
seeking attorney fees as part of its response costs.88 Nonethe-
less, the court addressed the issue and held that absent a Con-
gressional amendment of CERCLA, attorney fees are not
recoverable.8 9
In Fallowfield v. Strunk,90 Fallowfield brought an action
against Strunk, a former owner of Fallowfield's property, to
recover cleanup costs and attorney fees under CERCLA.9
79. Id. at 999.
80. S.C.A., 754 F. Supp. at 999.
81. Id. at 1003.
82. Id. at 1000.
83. Id. (quoting Regan v. Cherry Corp., 706 F. Supp. 145, 149 (D.R.I. 1989)).
84. 779 F. Supp. 223 (N.D.N.Y. 1991).
85. Id. at 226. Leonard had applied to the town for a subdivision and building
permit, which the town denied, stating that the application must be accompanied by
a site plan and Department of Health (DOH) approval for water supply and septic
systems.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 227.
88. Id. at 228.
89. Id. at 230.
90. FaUowfield, 766 F. Supp at 335. Contra Pottstown, 1992 WL 50084 at *1
(E.D. Pa. 1992)(district court in third circuit dismissed the issue of attorney fees in a
private party recovery action under CERCLA without prejudice, waiting for direction
from the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals in the Third Circuit).
91. Id. at 336. Strunk sold his property to Callaghan who assigned all rights to
[Vol. 10
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol10/iss1/11
1992] ATTORNEYS FEES
The court ruled that attorney fees are not recoverable under
CERCLA and denied Strunk's motion for reconsideration.92
The court based its decisions on two reasons. First, it ex-
amined the legislative history of CERCLA and determined
that Congress did not intend for private parties to collect at-
torney fees in private party cost recovery actions.98 Second, it
reasoned that, "absent explicit Congressional authorization,
attorney fees are not a recoverable cost of litigation."'94 Since
attorney fees are not specifically listed as recoverable in a pri-
vate party cost recovery action under CERCLA, the court de-
nied recovery. 5
In Anspec Co., Inc. v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,96 plaintiff
was an interim owner of a hazardous substance site.9 7 Anspec
and the current owner, Montgomery, brought a private recov-
ery action under CERCLA against the previous owner, Hoo-
ver,98 to seek indemnification for past and future costs and
attorney fees.9 9 While the court recognized that the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals had awarded attorney fees on this
issue,1°0 it also recognized that district courts in other circuits
Fallowfield. The agreement of sale between Callaghan and Strunk provided that the
property was free of hazardous, toxic, carcinogenic substances, and other pollutants.
In 1989, Fallowfield discovered bottles of chemicals buried on the property. State
and federal law required Fallowfield to initiate an investigation and a cleanup. Tests
revealed that the samples contained toxic and carcinogenic substances that were haz-
ardous wastes.
92. Id. at 338.
93. Id.
94. Id. (quoting Runyon, 427 U.S. 160, 185 (1976)).
95. Fallowfield, 766 F. Supp. at 338.
96. 788 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
97. Id. at 954-55. Anspec learned of the contamination of the site when it was
notified by the Michigan Department of Natural Resources (MDNR). The MDNR
required Anspec to test the site for contamination. Anspec hired environmental con-
sultants to perform these tests. The tests indicated that the site was contaminated.
98. Id. at 954. The former owner, Ultraspherics, operated a metal and plastic
grinding business and disposed of wastes from the grinding business in underground
storage tanks and underground septic tanks. Ultraspherics merged with Hoover. Hoo-
ver was the surviving corporation of the merger and assumed all assets and liabilities
of Ultraspherics.
99. Id. at 955. The plaintiffs also brought claims for fraud and nuisance as well
as a claim under the Michigan Environmental Protection Act.
100. See infra notes 109-20 and accompanying text. (The Litton court applied a
quasi plain meaning analysis and awarded attorney fees).
17
410 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
had refused to award attorney fees. The court did not find the
reasoning in Litton persuasive and refused to award attorney
fees as response costs under CERCLA. The court was not sat-
isfied with the Litton explanation of how the award of attor-
ney fees in private recovery actions harmonized with the
American Rule. The court was particularly troubled by:
[the] resulting incongruity of CERCLA, providing explicit
and unequivocal language allowing the government to
seek attorney fees under § 9604(b)(1), but providing only
a circumscribed textual basis, as stated in Litton for
granting the same right to private parties. What is more,
the holding in Litton does not consider Congress' failure
to include a provision for recovery of attorney fees by pri-
vate party litigants in the comprehensive amendments to
CERCLA passed in 1986.101
The court expressed further concern with the Litton holding
in its critique of the analysis.
While the court is well aware of the judicial tendency to
interpret CERCLA expansively in the hope of effecting its
remedial goals, it nonetheless believes that such an ambi-
tious effort with respect to the issue of attorney fees
would be disingenuous and would denigrate settled rules
of statutory interpretation and the integrity of the statu-
tory scheme. The court declines to invigorate the Litton
court's achievement of an expansion - rather than an in-
terpretation of the term 'response.'102
In Santa Fe Pacific Realty Corp. v. United States,105 the
plaintiff, Catellus (formerly Santa Fe Pacific Realty Corp.)
who owned property on which defendants, Clifford and Dora
Dana, leased a warehouse, brought an action against the
United States, Richard Armor (a sublessee), and the Danas. 04
101. Anspec, 788 F. Supp. at 957.
102. Id. at 958.
103. 780 F. Supp. 687 (E.D. Cal. 1991).
104. Id. at 689. The Danas subleased the warehouse to Richard Armor from 1981
to 1989. In 1989, county officials discovered hazardous substances on the property,
[Vol. 10
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Among its motions to dismiss, the government moved for
judgment on the pleadings on plaintiff's claim for attorney
fees. The court granted the motion.
Recognizing the dispute on the issue of attorney fee re-
covery in private response actions, the court noted that three
distinct lines of inquiry had emerged:
(1) whether the phrase 'enforcement activities related
thereto,' added to the definition of 'response' by the 1986
amendments to CERCLA, includes the activities of pri-
vate persons; (2) whether the language is sufficiently ex-
plicit to constitute congressional authorization for an
award of fees; and (3) the degree to which policy consider-
ations support an award of fees to a private party.
1 0 5
Examining the first line of inquiry, the court concluded
that it is not clear that private parties can incur attorney fees
underlying enforcement activities.106 Undertaking the second
the majority of which had been purchased by defendant Armor, from the United
States government.
Catellus sought
1) a declaration that all defendants are liable under the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act; 2) recovery of costs
under CERCLA against all defendants; 3) breach of lease against the Danas;
4) contractual indemnity against the Danas; 5) breach of third party benefi-
ciary contract against Armor; 6) negligence against the United States; ... 9)
nuisance against Armor and the Danas; 10) for strict liability against Armor
and the Danas; 11) waste against Armor and the Danas; and 12) conspiracy
against Armor and the United States.
Id.
105. Id. at 694.
106. Id. at 694-95. This court came to this conclusion even though it acknowl-
edged the Ninth Circuit had "twice characterized a response cost recovery brought by
a private party as a 'private enforcement action' since those characterizations only
appeared in dicta." The Santa Fe court also looked to legislative history to further
examine the first line of inquiry. The court found that the Committee on Energy and
Commerce's explanation that "section [101] also modifies the definition of 'response
action' to include related enforcement activities" supported the inference that Con-
gress did not intend private parties to recover enforcement costs. The court made this
inference in part because the Committee on Energy and Commerce followed this
statement with the words: "the change will confirm the EPA's authority to recover
costs for enforcement actions taken against responsible parties." The Santa Fe court
did not find the Conference Committee Report that omits reference to the EPA on
this precise issue to be persuasive.
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line of inquiry, the court determined that the language in
CERCLA is not sufficiently explicit to constitute Congres-
sional authorization to award attorney fees. 10 7 When the court
undertook the third line of inquiry, it held that policy consid-
erations did not support an award of attorney fees in private
recovery actions. 0 8
B. Quasi Plain Meaning
In General Electric v. Litton Industrial Automation Sys-
tems,109 the court of appeals applied a quasi plain meaning
approach and held that the language in CERCLA authorized
recovery."10 General Electric (GE) brought an action against
Litton, the previous owner of the site in question, seeking the
recovery of cleanup costs."' The district court held Litton lia-
107. Id. at 695. The court reasoned that Congress used explicit language in other
statutes to permit the recovery of attorney fees, however Congress did not use such
explicit language here.
108. Id. at 696. The court noted a striking similarity in the outcome of second
and third lines of inquiry in courts that have awarded attorney fees in private recov-
ery actions.
It is not for this court to impose a fee shifting provision simply because it
may be consistent with the statutory scheme or purposes of CERCLA. "The
power to declare what the law shall be belongs to the legislative branch of
government; the power to declare what the law is, or has been, belongs to the
judicial branch of government." (quoting In re Shear, 139 F. Supp. 217, 220
(N.D. Cal. 1956)).
109. Litton, 920 F.2d 1415.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1416-17. Royal McBee dumped cyanide based electroplating wastes,
sludge and other pollutants on the site of its Missouri typewriter plant prior to merg-
ing into Litton. Litton closed the plant in 1969 and in 1970 sold it to General Electric
(GE) without disclosing the dumping. In 1980, GE became aware of the dumping
when the Missouri Department of Natural Resources (MDNR) discovered that haz-
ardous substances had been dumped on the site. In 1981, MDNR and GE determined
that there was no groundwater contamination at the site and, therefore, did not per-
form a cleanup. In 1984, GE agreed to sell nineteen acres of the site to Enterprise
Park, a real estate concern that intended to use the land for commercial rather than
industrial purposes. In 1985, the MDNR proposed placing the site on the Missouri
Registry of Abandoned and Hazardous Waste Sites of Missouri. GE appealed the
state registry. Enterprise Park notified GE and Litton of potential CERCLA claims
regarding the nineteen acre tract. GE and Enterprise Park entered into a settlement
agreement making GE liable for the cleanup costs incurred at the site and requiring
GE to take all necessary actions to keep the site off the state registry. Pursuant to the
settlement agreement, GE and Enterprise Park negotiated a consent decree, and de-
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol10/iss1/11
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ble for cleanup costs and interest. The Eighth Circuit ordered
Litton to pay GE more than $419,000 in attorney fees and ex-
penses. " " On appeal, Litton argued that the district court
erred in allowing recovery of attorney fees.113 Affirming the
decision of the lower court,"" the court held that CERCLA
allows a private party to recover its attorney fees and ex-
penses incurred in bringing a cost recovery action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B)." The court recognized that the
American Rule denies the award of attorney fees, yet it held
that the statutory exception to the general American Rule ap-
plied. " 6 According to the court, the term "enforcement activi-
ties," authorized the recovery of attorney fees with a sufficient
degree of explicitness."'
The district court reasoned that this interpretation fur-
thered the purposes of CERCLA: prompt cleanup of hazard-
ous wastes and shifting the cost burden to the responsible
veloped and implemented a cleanup plan for the site. According to the decree, the
plan was to be consistent with the National Contingency Plan (NCP), the EPA
Superfund Program, 400 CFR pt. 300 and approved by the MDNR. GE began exca-
vation of the site and discovered four large drums, one containing extremely hazard-
ous waste. Most of the soil was disposed of as non-hazardous waste. The drums and
contaminated soil were disposed of as hazardous waste. The MDNR approved the
cleanup in early 1988 and removed the site from the registry.
112. Id. at 1417.
113. Litton, 920 F.2d at 1417. Litton also argued that: 1) GE should not recover
costs because the cleanup was induced by threat of a lawsuit from Enterprise Park, 2)
GE's response was not consistent with NCP, and 3) the district court erred in not
apportioning some cost to GE.
114. Id. at 1422.
115. Id. It also held that in response to Litton's first claim (that GE's response
was caused by a possible lawsuit), CERCLA is a strict liability statute with only a
limited number of statutorily-defined defenses available. The court reasoned that a
plaintiff's motives for cleanup were irrelevant and the only necessary inquiry was
whether or not there had been a release or threatened release. Id. at 1418.
Responding to Litton's second claim, the Appellate Court agreed with the lower
court in determining that GE's action was a removal in accordance with NCP. The
court reasoned that although CERCLA's definition of remedial action lists excava-
tions as a remedial example and its definition of removal action does not explicitly
mention excavations, excavations may also be considered a removal. In response to
Litton's third claim, the appellate court held that there were no non-necessary costs
and thus no costs should be apportioned to GE. Id. at 1418-20.
116. Id. at 1421-22.
117. Id. at 1422.
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party.11 8 Finally, the court stated that the purposes of CER-
CLA would be undermined if the non-polluter were forced to
pay litigation costs related to the response.11 9 Such an alloca-
tion of costs would discourage cleanup of hazardous waste
sites.120
Since Litton several district courts have applied a quasi
plain meaning approach awarding attorney fees as response
costs. In Key Tronic Corp. v. United States,'2' plaintiff Key
Tronic, who deposited hazardous substances at the Colbert
Disposal Site, sought contribution and recovery costs from the
United States Air Force and Alumax for disposing of hazard-
ous substances at the Colbert facility, and brought motions
for summary judgment to recover attorney fees and prejudg-
ment interest.122 The court held that attorney fees and pre-
judgment interest were recoverable as response costs. It
awarded attorney fees and costs incurred by attorneys -and in-
vestigators to search for potentially responsible parties, nego-
tiate for the Consent Decree, and prosecute the action. The
court emphasized the need to interpret CERCLA in accord
with its purpose when it stated that: "'CERCLA is essentially
a remedial statute designed by Congress to protect and pre-
serve public health and the environment, courts are obligated
to construe its provisions liberally to avoid frustration of the
beneficial legislative purposes in the absence of a specific Con-
gressional intent otherwise.' '1 It specifically contrasted the
situation of private response costs under CERCLA with Aly-
eska when it noted that: "the plaintiff in this case points to a
statutory provision which entitles the recovery of all necessary
118. Id.
119. Litton, 920 F.2d at 1422.
120. Id.
121. 766 F. Supp. 865 (E.D. Wash. 1991).
122. Id. at 866-67. The Colbert Disposal Site was maintained by Spokane
County, Washington, who had contracted with William Schmidt to accept and dis-
pose of refuse at Colbert. Key Tronic entered into a Consent Decree and agreed to
pay 4.2 million to clean up the site. Id. The Consent Decree did not, however, resolve
the issue of liability between Key Tronic and the United States.
123. Key Tronic, 766 F. Supp. at 871, (quoting Wilshire Westwood Assoc. v. At-
lantic Richfield, 881 F.2d 801, 804 (9th Cir. 1989)).
[Vol. 10
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol10/iss1/11
ATTORNEYS FEES
response costs. 124
In Gopher Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co.,125 Gopher Oil Co.
brought a CERCLA action against Union Oil Co. to recover
costs for investigating, cleaning up, and responding to a con-
taminated site in Minnesota.'26 Gopher moved for an amend-
ment to an earlier judgment to include an award of attorney
fees, costs, and disbursements.127 The court reasoned that
"Congress intended that those responsible for problems
caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the cost and
responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they cre-
ated."' " The court recognized that parties to a lawsuit ordi-
narily pay for their own attorney fees unless there is express
statutory authorization to the contrary. 29 Applying this ex-
ception, the court held that the term "enforcement activities"
authorized the award of attorney fees in private party CER-
CLA actions. "' It referred to policy issues and the purpose of
CERCLA when it stated:
Attorney fees and expenses necessarily are incurred in
this kind of enforcement activity and it would strain the
statutory language to the breaking point to read them out
of the "necessary costs" that § 9607 (a)(4)(B) allows pri-
vate parties to recover. We therefore conclude that CER-
CLA authorizes, with a sufficient degree of explicitness,
the recovery by private parties of attorney fees and ex-
penses. This conclusion based on the statutory language
is consistent with the two purposes of CERCLA-prompt
cleanup of hazardous waste sites and imposition of all
cleanup costs on the responsible party. These purposes
would be undermined if a non-polluter (such as GE) were
forced to absorb the litigation costs of recovering its re-
sponse costs from the polluter. The litigation costs could
124. Id. at 871.
125. 757 F. Supp. 998 (D. Minn. 1991).
126. Id. at 1001.
127. Id.
128. Id. (quoting United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100
(D. Minn. 1982)).
129. Id. at 1005.
130. Gopher, 757 F. Supp. at 1006 n.5.
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easily approach or even exceed the response costs,
thereby serving as a disincentive to clean the site." "
The court also hypothesized why Congress may not have
added the actual words "attorney fees" for private party ac-
tions when it amended CERCLA in 1986 with the SARA
amendments.13 2 It stated that "although Congress could have
specifically provided for recovery of attorney fees when it en-
acted SARA, the case law was not particularly well developed
prior to SARA and thus Congress may not have been aware
that courts would interpret CERCLA as disallowing the recov-
ery of attorney fees." 3 3 Thus, the court saw the absence of
express words as an oversight rather than an intentional deci-
sion to have private parties pay their own attorney fees and
expenses.
V. Analysis
Congress must take active measures to clarify the issue of
attorney fee recovery in CERCLA actions. The courts remain
divided on the issue and the Supreme Court has appropriately
refused to address this Legislative matter. Congressional ac-
tion will provide individuals and corporations notice of their
entitlements and responsibilities under CERCLA.
The general American Rule holds parties responsible for
their own attorney fees, yet the fees may be shifted if there is
explicit statutory authorization.3 4 To determine whether a
statute has explicitly authorized the recovery of attorney fees,
the plain meaning approach to statutory interpretation is the
appropriate analysis.3 6
Although CERCLA explicitly authorizes the recovery of
attorney fees in government and citizen suit actions, it does
not list attorney fees or litigation costs for private recovery
131. Id. at 1006-07.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1006 n.5.
134. See supra note 23.
135. See supra note 33.
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actions.186 The courts that have followed the purist plain
meaning approach have held that there is no explicit authori-
zation for attorney fee recovery. 7 These courts frustrate the
overall purpose of CERCLA in order to accurately apply the
explicit statutory exception of the general American Rule.
The quasi plain meaning advocates urge that the plain
meaning of the term "enforcement activities" includes the ac-
tivities of attorneys establishing the liability of responsible
parties.8 8 They argue that it is not possible to "ascertain any
other logical interpretation which would give effect to this
phrase .... [O]therwise the phrase 'enforcement activities'
would be superfluous. '"19 Courts that have found the term
"enforcement activities" to be explicit statutory authorization
for the recovery of attorney fees adhere to the overall purpose
of CERCLA, but stretch the meaning of explicit to the
extreme.
Providing for the recovery of attorney fees in private re-
covery actions would further the overall purpose of CERCLA,
nevertheless recovery is not explicitly listed. If recovery were
explicitly authorized, it would shift the cost to responsible
parties, encourage settlements, lower transaction costs, and
increase funds for the cleanup of hazardous substances.
Awarding attorney fees to parties who voluntarily clean up
hazardous wastes would encourage cleanup of such sites. Cur-
rent owners who voluntarily clean up property confront a sig-
nificant economic burden: cleanup costs and costs of recov-
ery.4 0 To recover the cost of cleanup, owners must usually
bring an action against the other responsible parties. " ' Such
an action will generate attorney fees and litigation ex-
penses. " 2 "It is also counterproductive to CERCLA's goals to
encourage parties who disposed of hazardous wastes to litigate
every conceivable issue in a cost recovery action, secure in the
136. See supra notes 1-16.
137. See supra notes 64-108.
138. Pease & Curren v. Spectrolab, 744 F. Supp. 945, 951 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
139. Id.
140. See supra note 62.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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knowledge that the only risk they face is the need to pay
clean-up costs if their defense is unsuccessful.
143
When current owners are not compensated for legal fees
incurred to recover removal costs, the net recovery does not
actually compensate them for their cleanup efforts. 14 More-
over, if parties knew they could recover attorney fees from re-
sponsible parties when they prevail in CERCLA actions, they
would be more willing to voluntarily clean up the sites.
145
Courts recognize that it is difficult for Congress to draft
statutes to such a degree of perfection and prescience. 146 Spe-
cifically, courts have criticized CERCLA for being poorly
drafted and hastily considered. 147 The inconsistency in the
courts indicates that even after the 1986 SARA amendments,
the statute continues to be a difficult document to inter-
pret. 48 While the statute may be difficult to interpret and its
terms may be unclear, it is the role of the legislature, not the
judiciary to clarify these terms. If Congress neglected to ex-
plicitly authorize the recovery of attorney fees in private re-
covery actions, it is not the role of the court to legislate from
the bench even if such a ruling would further the overall pur-
pose of the statute.
Clearly, the cleanup of hazardous substances has resulted
in a tremendous cost to industry, insurance companies, ana to
the U.S. taxpayer. The EPA spends $1.5 billion per year on
Superfund activities.149 Insurance companies spent approxi-
mately $410 million in 1989 alone. 50 Expenditures by PRPs
in 1989 were $6.1 million. An average cleanup of an NPL site
is $26 million plus transaction costs. 16' Some sites are esti-
mated to cost hundreds of millions.1 2
143. Brief for Appellee at 46, Litton (No. 89-2845).
144. Cf. Brief for Appellee at 46, Litton (No. 89-2845).
145. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 46, Litton, 920 F.2d at 1415 (No. 89-2845
WM).
146. See, e.g., Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1458.
147. See Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 373 (1986).
148. See supra notes 64-133 and accompanying text.
149. See Acton & Dixon, supra note 9, at xv.
150. Id. at xl.
151. Id. at 11.
152. Id.
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Critics of the liability system argue it has serious disad-
vantages. " A recent study conducted by the Rand Institute
for Civil Justice found that the liability system results in very
high transaction costs. Transaction costs involve costs that
have nothing to do with the actual cleanup. Another recent
study, by Resources for the Future, analyzes the liability sys-
tem and sets forth possible alternatives to the system.1" Con-
gress must closely scrutinize these and other studies when it
considers the statute for reauthorization. Such studies should
provide the context for a thorough evaluation of the proposed
changes to the statute.
According to Rand, insurance companies spent 88% of to-
tal Superfund expenditures on transaction costs.155 The insur-
ers allocated 42% of total expenditures to coverage disputes
and 37% of total expenditures on defense of policy holders. e6
Transaction costs of PRPs are also very high. Rand studied
the very large1 5 7 industrial firms and found that transaction
costs at these firms averaged 21% of total expenditures. ' 8
Rand found that the bulk of the transaction costs for these
firms was for legal representation. The firms that were able to
categorize the different types of transaction costs spent 75%
of the transaction costs on external or internal attorney
fees.l"
Despite the high transaction costs associated with the lia-
bility approach, the benefits of the liability approach still out-
weigh the disadvantages. Abandoning the liability approach
would eliminate the incentive for voluntary cleanup. The cost
of cleanup is enormous and should be paid by responsible par-
ties rather than the taxpayer. A system that relies on the effi-
ciencies of private industry can best accomplish the difficult
task of efficiently paying for the cleanup. The sites with PRP
153. See Probst & Portney, supra note 5, at 1-3.
154. Id.
155. See Acton & Dixon, supra note 9, at xi.
156. Id.
157. The EPA is currently studying transaction costs at small and medium size
firms.
158. See Acton & Dixon, supra note 9, at 33.
159. Id. at 41.
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financed cleanups have 18% lower costs than sites with gov-
ernment financed cleanups.'60 Eight percent of the large sites
in Rand's study were initiated by PRPs without any direct
government involvement. 161 One half of these PRP initiated
cleanups related to property transfers that stipulated that the
seller cleanup the site before the deal would close. 6 ' The
other PRP initiated cleanups resulted from state action and
private party law suits.163 If Congress abandoned the liability
approach for the cleanup of hazardous substances, taxpayers
would pay for the improper practices of industry and the ille-
gal release of hazardous substances which most often directly
or indirectly generated profits for the individual companies.
In addition, elimination of the liability system would cancel
virtually all incentives for efficiency. If PRPs did not have a
financial stake in the outcome of CERCLA actions, they
would not have an incentive to properly dispose of hazardous
substances and would not need to insist on efficient govern-
ment cleanup. In addition, PRPs would have no motivation to
initiate their own cleanups.
Rather than eliminate the liability system, it is important
for Congress to amend CERCLA. Specifically, Congress
should amend CERCLA to encourage settlements, reduce
transaction costs, and encourage PRP initiated cleanups. In
order to encourage such cleanups, Congress should amend the
statute to award attorney fees to prevailing parties in private
party response actions.
VI. Conclusion
Until Congress acts, some courts will stretch the meaning
of explicit to promote the overall purpose of the statute.
160. Id. at 55. When PRPs coordinated the cleanups they spent an average of
8% of total costs on transaction costs. The government spent 32-38% of total costs on
transaction costs when it coordinated the cleanup. Despite these figures, it is impor-
tant to note that Rand concluded that it was primarily multiple parties involved in a
site that resulted in increased transaction costs, not government coordination. Id. at
56, 58.
161. Id. at 47.
162. See Acton & Dixon, supra note 9, at 47.
163. Id.
[Vol. 10
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol10/iss1/11
1992] ATTORNEYS FEES 421
Other courts will frustrate the overall purpose of the statute
and deny recovery. Congress must clarify the terms of the
statute and answer the question: are attorney fees recoverable
in private recovery actions?
29
